Regret under different auction designs: the case of English and Dutch auctions by Ninoslav Malekovic (7107317) et al.
RESEARCH PAPER
Regret under different auction designs: the case of English
and Dutch auctions
Ninoslav Malekovic1 & Lazaros Goutas2 & Juliana Sutanto3 & Dennis Galletta4
Received: 31 January 2018 /Accepted: 23 June 2019
# The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
Studies have shown that users experience regret in online electronic auctions. Our study adds to the research on the antecedents of
regret by examining the effects of the major types of auction design on users’ experience of regret. Towards this goal, we
analyzed bidders’ experience of regret in English and Dutch auctions. Given that English and Dutch auctions are known to
produce different types of bidding behavior and outcomes, we expect that the two types of auction design will also have a
differential impact on experiencing regret. We report results from a lab experiment that was implemented as a self-developed
mobile application for hotel room reservations. We examined the effects of the two open-bid auction types on the experience of
regret, and found that users are more likely to experience regret in Dutch auctions. We point out the theoretical relevance and
practical implications of our findings.
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Introduction
ADeluxe room in the Radisson Cable Beach&Gold Resort in
Nassau, Bahamas is being auctioned online. Would it make a
bidder regretful if she wins the room by bidding too much or
loses it by not bidding enough? Would the answer depend on
the extent to which competing bids are visible to the bidder?
The benefits offered by electronic markets, defined as in-
dependently owned, IT-enabled intermediaries that connect
buying and selling organizations (Soh et al. 2006), are difficult
to dismiss. Compared to offline markets, electronic market-
places have increased social welfare with lower prices and
greater product selection, and have also increased market
efficiency and consumer surplus (Clemons et al. 2002;
Dimoka et al. 2012; Soh et al. 2006). In light of the above,
related research has focused on several key aspects of elec-
tronic markets, such as designing optimal market mechanisms
and auctions, understanding buyer and seller behavior, and the
economic modeling of online markets (Anandalingam et al.
2005). Despite these affordances and the fact that online mar-
ketplaces are known to close the information gaps between
buyers and sellers (Lusch et al. 2010), several market anoma-
lies (e.g., overbidding) have been observed in these environ-
ments (Feng et al. 2016). Among other things, such anoma-
lies, like general bidding behavior, have commonly been at-
tributed to the inherent emotions that are present in conditions
of decision-making under uncertainty (Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Katok 2008; Smith and Dickhaut 2005). In particular, one
type of emotion to which the electronic markets and auctions
literature has devoted particular attention is that of regret.
Regret is defined as “a more or less painful cognitive and
emotional state of feeling sorry for misfortunes, limitations,
losses, transgressions, shortcomings, or mistakes. It is an ex-
perience of felt-reason or reasoned-emotion. The regretted
matters may be sins of commission as well as sins of omission;
they may range from the voluntary to the uncontrollable and
accidental; they may be actually executed deeds or entirely
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mental ones committed by oneself or by another person or
group; they may be moral or legal transgressions or morally
and legally neutral” (Landman 1993: 36). Regret is a negative
emotion, whereby people realize or imagine that their present
situation would have been better, had they acted differently
(Kaur et al. 2016).
Within the context of auctions, bidders may generally ex-
perience winner regret by believing they overpaid for a prod-
uct in order to win an auction (Coricelli et al. 2005;
Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1989; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok 2008, 2009; Gretschko and Rajko 2014; Katuscak
et al. 2015), and loser regret by bidding too low in an attempt
to save money, thus losing the auction (Coricelli et al. 2005;
Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1989; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
2007, 2008, 2009; Gretschko and Rajko 2014; Katuscak et al.
2015). The extant literature has shown that both the post-
purchase experience of regret, as well as the mere anticipation
of it prior to purchasing a product, can influence users’ bid-
ding behavior and utility function (Hung et al. 2007; Jiang
et al. 2016).
Despite these advances, we still know little about the ante-
cedents of regret in onlinemarketplaces. To this end, our study
sets out to examine how certain structural characteristics of
electronic market design, i.e., different types of auction de-
sign, influence the experience of regret. We examine this re-
lationship in the context of online auctions by examining in-
stances of regret in two different open-bid auction types (i.e.
English and Dutch auctions). In addition to having a different
procedure, a key difference between these two auction types
concerns the amount of information observable during the
bidding process: Bidders in Dutch auctions see no bids from
other bidders except the final bid that ends an auction. In
contrast, bidders in English auctions can see the bids from
other bidders and consequently face less uncertainty in terms
of assessing the competitive dynamics in an auction (Cheema
et al. 2012). Our study examines the effects of different types
of auction design on the experience of regret. Effectively, our
research question is the following: Characterized by different
levels of bid disclosure, how do English and Dutch auction
designs compare with respect to bidder’s regret?
While bids disclosed in real-time influence bidding behav-
ior (Arora et al. 2007; Brocas et al. 2015; Cason et al. 2011;
Flanagin 2007; Gretschko and Rajko 2014; Gretschko and
Wambach 2014; Kannan 2012; Miettinen 2013; Soh et al.
2006), their impact on regret in open-bid auctions has yet to
be analyzed. Examining such behaviors in open-bid auctions
is important in order to obtain a more holistic understanding of
regret in online auctions. In an open ascending-bid auction,
the last submitted bid (which is the highest bid compared to
the previously submitted bids) wins the product. In an open
descending-bid auction, an auction starts by having an initial
high price set, which is then continuously lowered until one of
the bidders accepts the current standing price (Adam et al.
2017). It remains unclear if, disclosed in real-time as in the
open ascending-bid auction, competing bids cause winning
bidders to experience regret. On the one hand, disclosed com-
peting bids can be seen as a benchmark against which the
winning bidders experience winner regret. If no competing
bids are disclosed, then there is no benchmark, and the win-
ning bidders may not experience regret. Thus, as claimed by
Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2009), winning bidders should
experience more regret in an open ascending-bid auction than
in an open descending-bid auction. On the other hand, given
the independent private values, if the competing bids are
disclosed in real-time, as is the case with open ascending-bid
auctions, the winning bidders can learn from such bids how to
avoid regret. Therefore, the winning bidders should experi-
ence more regret in an open descending-bid auction, where
there is no disclosed competing bid from which the winning
bidders can learn how to avoid regret, than they should in an
open ascending-bid auction. We examine which of these two
competing claims prevails. We make an even more substan-
tive contribution to this stream of literature by analyzing the
regret experienced by losing bidders, alongside with the regret
that winning bidders might experience.
In sum, bid disclosures are interesting because they are a
systemic feature of online auctions and auction design.
Assuming independent private values, we examine how different
types of auction design, as characterized by the difference in bid
disclosures between open ascending-bid and open descending-
bid auctions, impacts regret. As we show in a subsequent section
of this paper, we draw our hypotheses by combining insights
from the literature on signaling theory (Drake et al. 2015;
Pavlou et al. 2007; Spence 2002) and auction fever (Adam
et al. 2011), and explain how the two types of auction design
that we consider in our study influence the experiencing of regret.
In sum, our study contributes to the understanding of regret ex-
perienced in online auctions by enquiring into the ways in which
differences in bid disclosure between open ascending-bid and
open descending-bid auctions impact bidders’ regret.
The remaining parts of the study are organized as follows:
In the following section, we outline related studies on regret,
uncertainty, and competitive dynamics in online auctions. In
the third section, we develop our hypotheses. The subsequent
sections describe our method, outline our results, discuss our
contributions, present implications for research and practice,
and state our study’s conclusions.
Related studies
Related studies on regret
The literature on user regret has shown negative implications
of experiencing regret. The presence of regret is known to
negatively influence user satisfaction, repurchase intention,
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and the continuance of using a particular service (Kaur et al.
2016). Even the anticipation of regret can influence user be-
havior: Users will adjust their choices in advance in order to
mitigate or minimize the experience of regret, which conse-
quently factors into users’ final purchasing decisions
(Greenleaf 2004; Jiang et al. 2016). Similarly, studies have
shown that incorporating regret in the utility function can ex-
plain some well-known behavioral anomalies, such as the
Allais Paradox, the coexistence of insurance and gambling,
the fact that people tend to be risk averse in the domain of
gains and risk-loving in the domain of losses, probabilistic
insurance, and preference reversals (see Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok 2008).
Within the context of auctions, the possibility for regret to
impact price levels in online auctions has been frequently
acknowledged in the literature (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1989;
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2007, 2008, 2009;
Kleinberg and Leighton 2003). Many researchers have tested
the so-called “regret aversion” hypothesis, which states that
bidders avoid anticipated winner regret by underbidding, and
avoid anticipated loser regret by overbidding (Dodonova and
Khoroshilov 2009; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2007,
2008, 2009). The phenomenon was initially observed in
first-price sealed-bid auctions (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007;
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2007, 2008, 2009).
However, recent replications refute the aversion hypothesis
(Dodonova and Khoroshilov 2009; Katuscak et al. 2015).
These replications suggest that the experimental method,
which the earlier studies employed, did not properly
operationalize the conditions of anticipated regret (for
additional information, see Katuscak et al. 2015).
Finally, in addition to examining the effects of regret on user
behavior or other outcomes (e.g. price levels, electronic market
profitability), research has also examined some limited anteced-
ents of regret. For instance, regret has been shown to depend on
the specific information that is provided to the winners or losers
of an auction (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1989). Recently, regret has
also been shown to depend on consumers’ uncertainty about
either the product’s objective attributes (e.g., a product’s quality)
or the consumer’s own preferences for a product’s known attri-
butes (Jiang et al. 2016). Taking stock of these studies, our study
seeks to better understand the antecedents of regret by enquiring
into the effects of auction design associatedwith different degrees
of bid disclosure on post-purchase regret.
Related studies on auction design, bidder behavior
and bid disclosure
The literature on auction design has a long-standing tradition
and a comprehensive review of this literature is outside the
scope of this study.1 Nonetheless, a number of studies have
examined optimal auction design under different market con-
ditions, including the number of participants (i.e. the number
of buyers or sellers in an auction), the type of items being
auctioned (divisible or discrete items), the number of items
being auctioned (single or multiple items), and the extent to
which products differ from each other (identical or discrete
items). Similarly, other studies have examined how different
components of auction design generate performance out-
comes (e.g. buyer or seller surplus). Examples of such com-
ponents include the mechanisms of winner determination,
payment determination, the design of information flows, and
the bidding language, i.e., the ways through which bidders can
express or submit their preferences (Anandalingam et al.
2005).
The most common types of auction design include English
(open ascending-bid) and Dutch (open descending-bid) auc-
tions. While the two types of auction design have several
structural differences, a key difference involves the extent to
which competing bids are visible to auction participants
(Cheema et al. 2012). The extent to which competing bids
are disclosed or not is important, because bid disclosures can
alter bidding behaviors (Arora et al. 2007; Brocas et al. 2015;
Cason et al. 2011; Hong et al. 2015; Kannan 2012). Relative
to sealed bids, disclosed bids are known to generate greater
value (Hong et al. 2015). The attempts of bidders to compet-
itively exploit an informational advantage, when bids are
completely disclosed, can also lead to higher prices (Cason
et al. 2011; Kannan 2012).
The above findings typically depend onwhether a common
value or independent private values of a product are assumed
across bidders (Babaioff et al. 2015a, 2015b; Brocas et al.
2015; Greenwald et al. 2010; Goeree and Offerman 2003;
Hong et al. 2015). Since high value uncertainty increases the
cognitive workload associated with placing an optimal bid,
variation of value uncertainty about a product’s ‘true’ value
across bidders determines the extent to which bidders deviate
from an optimal bid (Hariharan et al. 2016). “For the common
value component, information from other bidders in open-bid
auctions helps reduce valuation uncertainty,”where valuation
refers to the bidder’s ability to value a particular good (Hong
et al. 2015: 6). In contrast, if private values of an auctioned
product are mutually independent across bidders, disclosed
bids in open bid auctions do not inform a bidder on how to
reduce his or her valuation uncertainty (McGee 2013). In this
case, bid disclosure can then only reduce a bidder’s competi-
tion uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty in terms of identifying the
intensity of competition from other auction participants (Hong
et al. 2015).
As concerns our objective of better explaining the anteced-
ents of user regret, the amount of competition uncertainty
triggered by the extent of bid disclosure is particularly inter-
esting for the following reason: On the one hand, existing
research has shown that the presence of uncertainty can trigger1 For a detailed review, see Anandalingam et al. (2005).
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internal emotional processes and affect individual decision-
making (Hariharan et al. 2016). On the other hand, competi-
tive dynamics is also known to trigger and induce emotional
processes. Specifically, under a state of bid disclosure that
comes along with a heightened sense of competition, individ-
uals are more likely to experience the effects of competitive
arousal, which is an adrenaline-laden emotional state that
causes market participants to shift from a motivation to ac-
quire a product at a sensible price to a motivation to win an
auction at any cost (Hariharan et al. 2016; Ku et al. 2005).
In addition to leading to overbidding (Ariely and Simonson
2003), a heightened state of rivalry is likely to induce the
experience of greater pleasure from winning, simply because
a bidder is able to beat more rivals (Feng et al. 2016). Taking
the above insights into consideration, we believe that the ex-
tent to which bids are disclosed or not can be particularly
interesting in terms of potentially explaining other emotional
processes that might be present in electronic marketplaces,
most notably instances of user regret. We explain how this
might be the case in the next section, where we outline our
theory and our hypotheses.
Theory and hypotheses
As mentioned in the introduction, we derive our hypotheses
from signaling theory and the literature on auction fever,
which draws heavily on competitive arousal theory.
According to signaling theory, where information
asymmetries exist, interacting parties send signals to one an-
other to adjust their behaviors accordingly (Spence 2002).
“Signals are particularly important in online auctions where
information uncertainty exists in the product being sold, in the
seller, and in the other bidders” (Drake et al. 2015, pg. 37).
The ability of bidders to look for signals that may reduce their
uncertainty of the other bidders is facilitated or constrained by
different types of auction design, given that these disclose bids
to different degrees. Signals may come from the rate of bid-
ding, the current bid price, and the time left in the auction
(Drake et al. 2015). Since these signals are visible in English
auctions by way of the bids that are being disclosed, it is
reasonable to expect that the uncertainty of assessing the num-
ber of competing bidders is lower in English auctions than it is
in Dutch auctions. This holds especially because the private
values of an auctioned room in our study are assumed to be
independent across bidders, because the absence of a second-
ary market for auctioned rooms implies that no room reserva-
tion has a resale value.
At the same time, the inherent uncertainty in auctions is
founded upon the premise that social interactions in these
environments are more exciting than are social interactions
in static marketplaces (Adam et al. 2011; Möllenberg 2004).
Online auctions have a bazaar-like atmosphere that is
considerably more exciting compared to purchasing products
at a fixed price (Bapna et al. 2001). Under these conditions,
bidders are also likely to experience the phenomenon of auc-
tion fever; where the “adrenaline starts to rush, their emotions
block their ability to think clearly, and they end up bidding
much more than they ever envisioned” (Murnighan 2002: 63).
Moreover, the fundamental idea behind auction fever is that
bidders may not be purely driven by maximizing net surplus,
but might instead be motivated by other factors, such as the
thrill of winning (Feng et al. 2016) and sense of competition
and rivalry (Adam et al. 2011). According to competitive
arousal theory, the desire to win arises from the characteristics
of the competitive situation (Malhotra 2010).
Interestingly, due to their structural differences, English
and Dutch auctions can invoke different types of emotions,
depending on whether one wins or loses an auction (Adam
et al. 2012, 2015). Specifically, bidders experience stronger
immediate emotions when they lose a Dutch auction than
when they win it. This is attributed to the “click-to-win”
(“click-to-lose”) feature of Dutch auctions, where the bidder
who wins is prepared and fully aware of winning the auction
with certainty, while for the remaining bidders losing the auc-
tion comes as an unpleasant surprise. The exact opposite re-
sults can be found in English auctions, where bidders can
decide to stop bidding and lose the auction with certainty
(Adam et al. 2017). The experimental comparison of the bid-
ders’ heart rates and bidding behavior has shown that an
English auction, as a collection of stimuli, induces less emo-
tional processing than the Dutch auction does (Smith and
Dickhaut 2005): The ability of bidders to look for signals that
inform their bidding behavior will induce less emotional bid-
ding; they will be able to think more clearly, which should
lead to less regret. Given that such signals are more prominent
in English auctions as compared to Dutch auctions, we there-
fore hypothesize:
H1: Bidders in Dutch auctions are more likely to experi-
ence winner regret, compared to bidders in English
auctions.
H2: Bidders in Dutch auctions are more likely to experi-
ence loser regret, compared to bidders in English
auctions.
Research methodology
Participants and experimental design
Our inferences were tested experimentally on graduate student
participants affiliated with a university in Europe. In order to
achieve the statistical power of 0.8, the Wilcoxon test showed
that at least 32 participants are required for each of the control
N. Malekovic et al.
and two treatment groups respectively.2 Thus, our total sample
size was 96. Our participants’ mean age was 22.4 (SD = 2.8).
Thirty-seven were female (38.5%) and fifty-nine were male
(61.5%). The participants took part in a one-shot auction sce-
nario, which was scripted as a reservation for a single hotel
room. The experiment was enabled through a self-developed
mobile application. The interface designed for the mobile ap-
plication resembled that of a leading online hotel reservation
platform. Because there is no secondary market for such res-
ervations, they do not have a resale value. Therefore, each
participant’s respective value of the reservation is independent
and private rather than common (Goeree and Offerman 2003;
Fuchs et al. 2011). Our treatment was the type of auction
design (fixed price baseline vs. English auction vs. Dutch
auction). The participants were randomly assigned to one of
the three treatment conditions, and their participation was in-
centivized accordingly. Finally, our dependent variables were
winner and loser regret, established in a post-task survey of
the participants.
Pretesting the scenarios
Initially, we devised three scenarios: One for the control
group, and two for the two treatment groups, respectively.
The average room price on booking.com was € 151/night
(SD = 31). This price was chosen for our fixed price scenario.
We also used a description for an actual room near that mean
price for greater realism. These two considerations determined
the scenario for the control group baseline.
Our rationale was for each of the two respective scenarios
for the two treatment groups to consist of a specific auction
design. We consulted three hotel owners to determine specific
opening prices and bid increments and decrements for the two
auction designs. In short, the open descending-bid auction
started from the opening price of € 240 (60% higher than
the control group’s price). The auction clock discretely de-
creased the price by € 10.3 until the first bid was submitted.
This first bid settled the price, which immediately and sudden-
ly determined the winner and losers. Furthermore, the open
ascending-bid auction started from the opening price of € 60
(40% of the control group’s price). Each participant irregularly
submitted his or her respective bid. Across bidders, each sub-
sequently submitted bid was set to be € 10.3 higher than the
highest previously submitted bid. The bidding continued until
the auction clock ended it. The last bid settled the price, and
determined the winner and losers.
Our pretest rationale was intended to assure that each sce-
nario was easy to understand. Its purpose was also to make
participants’ responses manageable. There were two auction
sequences that we pretested for the two respective treatment
groups. We pretested the two sequences three times. The pre-
tests were conducted on two groups of 9 pretest participants,
one for each of the two auction sequences. The first pretest
showed an extensive frequency of missing data. Many of the
pre-test participants did not understand the use of the auction
clock. In response, we revised the instruction, by explaining
the clock’s operation more simply. The second pretest showed
that missing data did not disappear. Many of the pre-test par-
ticipants reportedly could not provide timely responses to a
sequence to which they were exposed. Thus, we shortened
each sequence from five one-shot auctions to a single one-
shot auction. The third pretest confirmed that the pretest par-
ticipants’ responses were entered on a timely basis.
Variables
Dependent variables
Earlier studies defined regret as a function of the difference in
payoff between the bidding decision taken ex-ante and the
optimal decision taken ex-post after all information has been
disclosed (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007). Our regret measures
were informed by these studies, as well as Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (1989). However, rather than measuring regret in
terms of actual bids as compared to prices (Filiz-Ozbay and
Ozbay 2007; Katuscak et al. 2015), our study measured win-
ner and loser regret by employing questionnaire items:Winner
regret was measured by the extent of agreement to a claim that
the participant regrets bidding too much, and could have got-
ten the roommore cheaply. On a similar scale, loser regret was
measured as a claim that the participant regrets bidding less
than he or she was ready to bid, losing the room. These two
five-point scales ranged from “Strongly disagree” to
“Strongly agree” (please refer to the Appendix).
Treatment
Our treatment was the type of auction design. The baseline is
the fixed price scenario (coded 0). The open ascending-bid
auction scenario is coded 1; whereas the open descending-
bid auction scenario is coded 2 (please refer to the Appendix
for the different scenarios).
Control variables
Following our earlier discussion, price can influence partici-
pants’ regret (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2007, 2008,
2009). To control for this, we controlled the cumulative price
effects of competition and valuation on our regret measures.
2 We calculated the sample size and statistical power for a two-tailed sample
comparison for ordinal outcomes under the proportional odds ordinal logistic
model (Whitehead 1993). Our sample size and statistical power determination
was calculated for cumulative odds ratio equal to 3.5, which follows from the
combination of our dependent, treatment, and control variables, as well as the
assumption that the control and treatment probabilities across ordinal re-
sponses follow a uniform prior.
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For realism, rather than us calculating the difference between
the final room reservation pricing and each participant’s esti-
mate of private value for this reservation, we had participants
themselves estimate this difference directly. By asking the
participants if the winning bidder’s price for their intended
room reservation was high or low, we made each participant
respectively assess this difference. This control variable, re-
ferred to as the price level, was coded on a five-point scale,
from “low” to “high” (please refer to the Appendix).
We provided all the rooms with an identical description
(please refer to the Appendix): The rooms are perfect substi-
tutes, and their descriptions were identical, eliminating any
residual possibility for the observations of winner and loser
regret to cluster across bidders.
Moreover, uncertainty aversion results in the behavior of
humans, when exposed to uncertainty, to attempt to reduce
that uncertainty (Kahneman and Tverksy 1984). Given the
enjoyment that bidders may derive from the suspense, we
adopted a measure of uncertainty aversion from Yoo et al.
(2011). Participants were asked to state their agreement with:
“Auctions are fun” on a five-point scale from “Strongly dis-
agree” to “Strongly agree” (please refer to the Appendix). The
measure was multiplied by −1 to obtain an indirect yet useful
indicator of uncertainty aversion. By controlling for the price
level and uncertainty aversion, we also indirectly controlled
for the participant’s risk aversion (Hong et al. 2015).
Finally, we controlled for the participant’s age, gender, and
experience with online auctions (Hong et al. 2015). We sur-
veyed the participant’s experience in years (expyears). The
participant’s experience with online auctions in years was
coded on a five-point ordinal scale. The five-point scale
ranged from: a) none, b) less than 1 year, c) more than 1 year
but less than three years, d) more than 3 years but less than
5 years, to e) more than 5 years. In addition, we surveyed the
frequency of the participant’s earlier experience with online
auctions (exptimes). This experience variable was coded on a
four-point ordinal scale, ranging from a) 0 times, b) from 1 to
5 times, c) from 6 to 10 times, to d) more than 10 times. These
two variables were positively correlated (Spearman’s rho =
0.825), and we multiplied them to obtain the composite expe-
rience variable.
The procedure
Participants were assigned to booths in a computer laboratory.
They were randomly assigned to control (the fixed price base-
line; fixed price) and treatment (auction) groups, each
consisting of 32 participants. The number of auctioned room
reservations per group was equal to the number of participants
in each group. The participants were presented with specific,
on-screen instructions. Participants in the two treatment
groups were exposed to either of the two auction designs, as
characterized by open ascending-bid or open descending-bid
auctions. Following the auctions, the participants were
prompted to report their winner and loser regret. The re-
sponses were collected automatically and anonymity was
guaranteed. To prevent arbitrary choices and ensure reliable
data, we incentivized our participants: The participants were
instructed to submit realistic bids that would reflect their be-
havior, as if they were bidding in reality for a room: Those
who did so would receive compensation in the amount of €
30. Given that we were in a position to trace bids on a real-
time basis, we informed participants that those who submitted
unrealistic bids would not be compensated. This was a place-
bo since we controlled for the bid increment in the English
auction, i.e., each subsequently submitted bid was set to be €
10.3 higher than the highest previously submitted bid, to en-
sure that they would not be able to submit an unrealistic bid
such as ten times the amount of the highest previously sub-
mitted bid. We debriefed the participants about the placebo
before giving them compensation for participating in the ex-
periment. In the end, all 96 subjects received compensation for
taking part in the study.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics of our control var-
iables. A brief glance across the central tendencies and stan-
dard deviations suggests that for no control variable the con-
trol and two treatment groups differ significantly: In particular,
the difference between the price levels across the three groups
is statistically insignificant (Kruskal-Wallis test statistic =
1.7187, p value = 0.4234). Further, Table 2 displays the par-
ticipants’ descriptive regret measures in the different
scenarios.
Main analysis
Table 3 shows the estimated effects on the two regret mea-
sures. For comparability, the estimated parameters were
standardized:
N = 96. Statistical significance at *: 95%, **: 99%, ***:
99.9%.
Top number is beta weight and bottom number in paren-
theses is standard error.
According to H1, taking part in Dutch auctions makes bid-
ders more likely to experience winner regret than taking part
in English auctions does. Shown in the second column of
Table 3, the results support H1. Further, H2 posits that taking
part in Dutch auctions makes bidders more likely to experi-
ence loser regret than taking part in English auctions does. In
the Dutch auction, the estimate for loser regret strongly sup-
ported H2 (beta loser regret = 0.334, std. error = 0.488).
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Therefore, as shown in the third column, the results support
H2.
Among the control variables: The participants’ perceived
price level, estimated as their assessment of final pricing mi-
nus a respective participant’s private value, increases their
winner regret experience. While experience with online auc-
tions alleviates the participants’ experience of both regret
types, age aggravates the participant’s experience of loser re-
gret. The next section presents a detailed discussion of these
findings.
Discussion
Research implications
First and foremost, our study contributes towards a better un-
derstanding of the antecedents of user regret. While numerous
studies have examined the effects of regret on bidding behav-
ior (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2007, 2008, 2009), little
remains known about the emotional state of regret. By build-
ing on studies such as those of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989)
and Jiang et al. (2016), our study shows how different types of
auction design induce the emotion of regret. To achieve this,
we drew our insights from the literature on auction fever
(Adam et al. 2011): We showed how, due to the disclosed
competing bids, the emotions triggered by a heightened sense
of rivalry can spillover towards inducing regret. We achieved
this by examining instances of both winner and loser regret,
and illustrated how different types of auction design are more
likely to induce the actual experience of regret.
Additionally, our studymakes an important contribution to the
literature on auctions by showing how auction design can induce
the experience of regret, by disclosing competing bids to variable
degree. The prevailing logic suggests that a disclosed difference
between the first and second highest bids causes winner regret
(Dodonova and Khoroshilov 2009; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok 2007, 2008, 2009; Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007;
Katuscak et al. 2015). Following this logic, due to the missing
disclosure of a second highest bid in the open descending-bid
auction, there should be nowinner regret in the open descending-
bid auction (Dodonova andKhoroshilov 2009). Our finding con-
tradicts this logic, and points to a contrary finding: A missing
disclosure of a second highest bid in fact causes more winner
regret than the open ascending-bid auction does.
A final important finding in our study includes the following:
Since the open-bid auctions do not protect bidders from
experiencing regret, they can individually protect themselves
from experiencing regret only by underbidding or overbidding.
Relative to the fixed price, the winners in the open ascending-
bid auction learned from disclosed competing bids that the price
they paidwas higher than the second highest bid (Dodonova and
Khoroshilov 2009). Hence, they experienced winner regret.
However, relative to the fixed price, relying on the knowledge
of disclosed competing bids, they did not experience loser regret
more than they would have in the fixed price condition.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of
control variables (standard
deviations in parentheses)
Group ID Age Experience Uncertainty
Avoidance
Gender
(m/f)
Price
Level
Total
N
Control group: Fixed price
baseline
22.55 (2.66) 2.13 (1.04) 3.94 (0.62) 19/13 3.26 (1.31) 32
1st treatment group: Open
ascending-bid auction
22.31 (2.79) 1.81 (0.81) 4.09 (0.72) 22/10 3.14 (1.31) 32
2nd treatment group: Open
descending-bid auction
22.06 (2.90) 1.81 (0.88) 4.22 (0.54) 18/14 3.31 (1.10) 32
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for regret measures (means with standard
deviations in parentheses)
Competitive price assessments: Winner regret Loser regret
Fixed price baseline 2.48 (1.37) 2.07 (1.11)
Open ascending-bid auction 2.81 (1.10) 2.44 (1.30)
Open descending-bid auction 3.43 (1.22) 3.00 (1.25)
Table 3 Regression results for winner and loser regret
Winner regret Loser regret
CONTROLVARIABLES:
Age 0.004 0.006**
(0.072) (0.070)
Gender 0.027 −0.022
(0.404) (0.402)
Experience −0.001* (0.041) −0.003** (0.046)
Uncertainty Aversion 0.026 0.009
(0.294) (0.306)
Price Level 0.092*** (0.204) 0.020
(0.178)
TREATMENT: Auction design
type – Fixed price baseline
Open ascending-bid auction
(English auction)
0.263** (0.498) 0.155
(0.487)
Open descending-bid
auction (Dutch auction)
0.422*** (0.523) 0.334*** (0.488)
R-squared 0.340 0.210
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Interestingly, as we hypothesized, the bidders in the open
descending-bid auction experienced the highest winner and los-
er regret despite not knowing the second highest bid.
Implications for practitioners
Compared with traditional markets, electronic marketplaces
and online auctions have several distinguishing features.
These features include: 1) the removal of geographical bar-
riers, which enables worldwide participation, 2) the enabling
of asynchronous bidding, which makes online auctions more
flexible and easier for people to participate, and 3) substan-
tially lower operational costs. Therefore, online auctions can
charge lower commission fees and attract more sellers and
buyers (Ariely and Simonson 2003). The fact that bidders in
online auctions do not physically cluster in the same geo-
graphical location also implies that these bidders have to rely
on other value cues to guide their bidding behavior (Ariely
and Simonson 2003). In online auctions, bidders might have a
hard time in sensing the degree of competition for a particular
product. Our study shows that certain types of auction design
can mitigate this problem better than other types can.
Notwithstanding the unique features of online auctionsmen-
tioned earlier, participation in online markets has also been
associated with several problems, including those of psycho-
logical distress (i.e., anxiety, aggression, anger and depression),
habitual usage, as well as dependency and withdrawal symp-
toms (Park et al. 2016). Our study shows that the experience of
post-purchase regret is another problem that can be added to
this list. Most importantly, mitigating experiences of regret is
especially important for marketplaces where user satisfaction,
the repurchasing intention, and the intention to continue using a
certain service is of particular importance (Kaur et al. 2016). In
such cases where a key objective is the minimization of regret,
sellers might want to consider adopting auction designs that
minimize the possibility of experiencing regret, and as our
study shows, English auctions would be a helpful choice.
Our study demonstrates that regret can be mitigated
through auction or marketplace design. Benchmarked against
fixed price as a baseline for certainty, our open ascending-bid
auction was found to be associated with less winner regret
than was our open descending-bid auction. Furthermore,
against the same benchmark, our open ascending-bid auction
was found to cause no loser regret at all (i.e., not significantly
different from loser regret in the fixed price condition). For
this reason, taking into account both regret mitigation and
auction-based revenue generation parameters, designers of
online marketplaces can consider employing open
ascending-bid auctions rather than open descending-bid auc-
tions. Finally, before settling exchange terms, by using open
ascending-bid auctions, practitioners can deprive customers of
some but not all information on competition, encouraging the
most potent buyers to self-identify, thus limiting the levels of
regret. As a final note, practitioners can encourage younger,
but more experienced bidders to participate.
Limitations and research directions
Our study does not come without limitations. While the different
types of auction design in our study disclose competing bids to a
different degree, simultaneously disclosing bidding rivalry
(Adam et al. 2011), the degree of bid disclosure is not the only
distinguishing factor between English and Dutch auctions.
Specifically, these two design types can also cause different bid-
ding behavior and wait times (Cheema et al. 2012). Therefore,
we have to remain cautious that our observed effects can be a
byproduct of a number of design differences. As a final limita-
tion, our study did not employ an auctioneer, as the allocation and
payment rules were automated, given the particular auction type.
Several research extensions can bemade to our study: First,
researchers could test to see if bidders can avoid regret by bid
rigging. One instance of bid rigging is collusive bidding, by
which a coalition of bidders stifles competition. Another in-
stance of bid rigging is chandelier bidding, by which an auc-
tioneer’s false bids encourage competition. Moreover, future
research should consider testing to see whether a seller pro-
posing a purchase price could impact experiencing regret (on
either a successful or failed purchase) (Cason and Friedman
1996). Researchers can also investigate seller regret on either a
successful or failed sale. Simultaneously proposing purchase
and sale prices, researchers can study even more complex
exchange behaviors under competition, like speculation or
market rigging. If the resulting market prices cannot clear
the markets, as in bubbles or crises (Allen and Douglas
2000), this may set the stage for the study of even more com-
plex instances of regret. Finally, our study only examined
instances of post-purchase regret. A more holistic understand-
ing of the ways in which different auction types cause regret,
would also require testing its effects on anticipated regret.
In conclusion, our study relates the experience of regret to
systemic auction design features. In doing so, our study con-
tributes to the understanding of the antecedents of regret, as
conditioned by the different design features of online auctions.
Our study also provides specific ideas for additional research
to better understand how both user and seller regret unfolds
under different types of auction design.
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Appendix
The wording of the measures/instruments.
1. The room description:
The simple, stylish single hotel rooms at Brook Green
have air conditioning and tea and coffee facilities. All
rooms feature a flat-screen TV, suit press, and a private
modern bathroom with a hairdryer. Guests can enjoy a
full English breakfast each morning, and hearty evening
meals are also available. The cozy pub also features real
open fires, leather sofas, and a pretty terrace. Less than
half a mile from Hammersmith Underground Station,
The Brook Green hotel is 1.5 miles from Earls Court
Exhibition Centre. Hammersmith Apollo is only half a
mile away.
2. Dependent variables:
Winner regret:
“I regret bidding too much, and could have gotten the
room cheaper.”
1. Strongly Disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neither Disagree nor
Agree, 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree.
Loser regret:
“I regret bidding less than what I was ready to bid,
losing the room”
1.Strongly Disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neither Disagree nor
Agree, 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree.
3. Treatment:
Description of instruction for the fixed price scenario:
Your age in years: ____.
7. Gender:
Your gender:
a) male, b) female.
8. Experience in years: Below you see a list of hotel
rooms. The booking price is fixed. If any given room
has not been booked, then that room is available. If you
wish to book an available room, then press “Book.”
Please book only one room. Booking is done on the first
come, first serve basis.
Description of the instruction for the open ascending-bid
auction scenario:
Below you see a list of hotel rooms. The current bid price is
updating dynamically to reflect the currently highest bid for
any given room. If you wish to bid for a room, enter the
currently displayed amount increased by € 10.3 in the text
box and press “Submit bid.” Please submit only one bid
across all of the listed rooms. When the time at the top is up,
the person having bid the most for a given room wins this
room.
Description of the instruction for the open descending-bid
auction scenario:
Below you see a list of hotel rooms. The current bid price is
updating dynamically to reflect the currently lowest bid for
any given room. If you wish to bid for a given room, when
the proposed price reaches a price you find acceptable, press
“Accept bid.” Please submit only one bid across all of the
listed rooms. The first person to have accepted the bid for a
given room wins this room.
4. Price level:
“The price of the room for which I competed was”.
1. Low, 2. Moderately Low, 3. Neither Low nor High, 4.
Moderately High, 5. High.
5. Participant’s uncertainty aversion:
“Auctions are fun.”
1.Strongly Disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neither Agree nor
Disagree, 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree.
6. Age:
How many years of experience do you have with online
auctions?
a) none,
b) less than 1 year,
c) more than 1 year but less than 3 years,
d) more than 3 years but less than 5 years,
e) more than 5 years.
9. Frequency of experience.
How many times have you participated in online auctions?
a) not at all,
b) from 1 to 5 times,
c) from 6 to 10 times,
d) more than 10 times.
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